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Book	Reviews
of  the  conceptual  differences  between  Jahr  
and Georgetown bioethics are given. The sec-
ond  part  of  the  book  ends  with  an  overview 
of several visions of the development and the 
future of bioethics.
As	 the	 authors	Amir	Muzur	 and	 Iva	 Rinčić	
state  in  the  preface  to  their  book  Van  Rens-
selaer Potter and His Place in the History of 
Bioethics,	after	researching	the	life	and	work	
of	Fritz	Jahr,	it	seemed	logical	to	proceed	and	
explore	 the	 life	 and	work	of	 another	 “father	
of	bioethics”,	Van	Rensselaer	Potter	 (1911	–	
2001).	Van	Rensselaer	Potter	of	the	Universi-
ty of Wisconsin was a biochemist-oncologist 
by	profession	 but	 a	 humanist	 by	 conviction,	




their	 relevance.	 Conceiving	 “global	 bioeth-
ics”	in	the	late	1980s,	Potter	sought	to	move	
bioethics beyond North America to other con-
tinents	 and	 cultures.	 Potter’s	 contribution	 to	
the  content  and  methodological  foundations  
of	integrative	bioethics	was	significant.








Potter had contacts during the last years of his 
life,	the	authors	offered	Potter’s	biography	to	
the	reading	audience.	The	new	English	edition	
of this book has minor changes in its content 
regarding	the	Croatian	edition.	First	of	all,	it	
also  lacks  image  material  and  does  not  con-
tain	 a	 list	 of	 Potter’s	 bibliography.	 Never-
theless,	 the	English	 edition	does	not	 lose	 its	






to  gain  recognition  in  his  homeland  at  least  
posthumously.
However,	even	if	such	recognition	would	fail,	
the	 English	 translations	 of	 these	 two	mono-
graphs	 will	 inevitably	 confirm	 the	 authors’	
contribution	 to	 promoting	 Fritz	 Jahr’s	 ideas	
and understanding of Potterian bioethics. Fur-
thermore,	 it	will	 provide	 a	broader	 audience	
with  a  safe  starting  point  for  a  better  under-
standing of  the  development  path  and future  











Books	 and	 articles	 on	 Karl	 Marx’s	 theories	
have  been  cursed  with  a  Tantalean  task  of  
distancing themselves  from distortions  brou-
ght	 on	 by	 a	multitude	 of	 “Marxisms”,	 espe-
cially  the  ones  that  are  built  on  ideologies.  
Norbert  Walz  tries  to  avoid  the  problematic  
aspects  by  consulting  authors  from  different  
fields	 –	 humanist	 Marxism,	 value	 criticism,	
critical theory and new works on Marxist the-
ory	(p.	9).	In	broadest	strokes,	the	book	deals	




Marxism,	 therefore,	 is	 not	 understood	 as	 a	








value  and  necessity  has  changed  throughout  
the years. 
Marx’s	 theory	 covers	 history	 and	 historical	
analysis,	 the	critique	of	 ideological	 forms	of	
societal	morality,	politics	and	 laws	 that	 legi-
timise property and employment relationships 
but  intertwine  as  critique  of  the  State  and  
the	 “religion	 of	 everyday	 life”	 (pp.	 11–12).	
Usually,	 the	main	 focus	 of	most	 researchers	
regarding	 Marx’s	 critique	 is	 the	 political	
economy,	 and	 the	philosophical	 terms,	 ideas	
and methodology are left out. The critique of 
societal  interactions  cannot  be understood in  
its entirety only from the prospect of political 
economy. It is important to note that the foun-
dation of economic and societal critique is ba-
sed	on	philosophical	thought.	Engels	and	the	
protagonists of the Second international used 
this powerful foundational tool not to ground 
the movement but to legitimise Marxism as a 
worldview	(pp.	11–12).	
The	book	 is	divided	 into	seven	parts,	with	a	
“Foreword”,	 “Summary”	 and	 a	 “Bibliograp-




leitung”],	 “Marxist	 philosophy	 and	 world-
view-Marxism”	 [“Marxistische	 Philosophie	
und  Weltanschaungsmarxismus”]  (chapter  
2),	“Back	 to	 the	roots:	The	 leitmotif	and	 the	
secondary	 topics	 of	 Marx’s	 theory”	 [“Back	
to	 the	 roots:	 Das	 Leitmotiv	 und	 die	 Neben-
themen	der	Marxschen	Theorie”]	(chapter	3),	
“Critique	of	social	abstractions”	[“Kritik	der	
gesellschaftlichen  Abstraktionen”]  (chapter  
4),	“The	centre	of	criticism	and	its	repression”	
[“Das	Zentrum	der	Kritik	und	seine	Verdrän-
gung”]	 (chapter	 5),	 “What	 is	 Philosophy?”	
[“Was	 ist	 Philosophie?”]	 (chapter	 6),	 “Con-
crete	 Philosophy”	 [“Konkrete	 Philosophie”]	
(chapter	 7),	 “Summary”	 [“Zusammenfa-
ssung”]	(chapter	8).	
The	starting	point	 (chapter	2)	 is	 the	analysis	
of creation of Marxism as a worldview in the 
19th  century  with  Walz  pointing  out  the  in-
fluence	of	works	as	Anti-Dühring [Herrn Eu-
gen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft] 
(1877/1878),	 Der  Ursprung  der  Familie,  
des  Privateigentums  und  des  Staats	 (1884),	
Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der kla-
ssischen  deutschen  Philosophie  (1886/1888) 
by	 Friedrich	 Engels	 (p.	 17).	 The	 analysis	 is	
completed with seven points of the philosoph-
ical	 enhancements	 to	 the	 theory	of	 scientific	
socialism.
The counter-movements of Western Marxism 
and  individual  sub-currents  of  interpretation  
of	Marx’s	theory	broke	with	the	unity	of	the	
worldview-Marxism	(p.	13,	p.	17).	The	mul-
titude  of  interpretation  scratched  beyond  the  
surface	 of	Marx’s	 and	Engels’	works	 as	 “an	





The discussion on the critique of the societal 
abstractions	(chapter	4)	starts	with	Walz’s	re-
view	of	Hegels	 reflections	 on	 the	 individual	
and	 the	 general.	Marx’s	 critique	 of	 political	
economy reads like an attempt to realise this 
appreciation among people. It intends this by 
the means of a critique of social abstractions. 
Social  abstractions  are  historical  restrictions  
that have arisen under certain conditions and 
prevent  the  ascribing  value  to  the  individual  
being.	 In	other	words,	 the	fetishisation	 theo-
rems  with  which  Marx  asserted  the  inverted  
world thesis  are  redeemed with the criticism 
of social abstractions. From the perspective of 
the	critique	of	abstraction,	Marx	is	concerned	




struments of the critique of political economy as a 
critique	of	social	abstractions.	Communism,	on	the	
other	hand,	represents	a	form	of	society	in	which	so-
cial abstractions are eliminated and direct producer 
autonomy	is	established.”	(p.	13)
Following	 chapter	 5,	 it	 is	 quite	 unmistaka-
bly	 evident	 that	 Marx’s	 theory	 is	 not	 only	
economic	 theory	and	also	not	 just	 a	 critique	
of	 economics,	but	 also	 includes	on	a	 further	
level  the  explanation  of  why  the  production  
agents  come  forth  as  not  only  economic  but  
life-sustaining	 issues.	 In	 other	words,	 it	 is	 a	
critique	of	the	entire	bourgeois	reality	of	life,	
including	 reproduction	 and	 the	 State,	 which	
also includes a theory of the ideology of this 
“perverted”	reality	of	life	(p.	59).
“The	 Marxian	 concept	 of	 critique	 implies	 much	
more	 than	a	mere	 economic	critique,	because	 it	 is	
directed to the criticism of the whole reality of life in 
bourgeois	society.	The	focus	of	criticism,	however,	
is	the	person;	it	only	appears	occasionally	in	Marx	
after	 1844,	 since	 it	 is	 either	 speculatively	 equated	
with the proletariat or has a connotation that is am-
bivalent	to	philosophy.”	(p.	13)
The concept of criticism used by Marx is in no 
way	limited	to	an	interpretation,	as	the	subtitle	
of	his	main	work	may	suggest,	A Critique of 
Political  Economy.	 As	 already	 mentioned,	
criticism in the Marxian sense can only be a 




leave any universally applicable instruction.
In	“What	is	Philosophy?”	(chapter	6),	it	is	su-
ggested that philosophy would be the entirety 
of	the	philosophical	teachings,	arranged	either	
historically in the order in which they appear 








the  other  hand also  as  the  sceptical  questioning  of  
the	self-evident.	Since	Socrates	and	Plato,	it	has	pri-
marily	focused	on	practical	 life	and	its	challenges,	
which has been pushed into the background by me-
taphysical	tradition	since	Aristotle.”	(p.	13)







c)	 last	 but	 not	 least,	 the	 practical	 testimony	
implies that the philosophical questions or re-
sults	cannot	achieve	“being	in	itself”	or,	as	it	
is	called	in	German	idealism,	the absolute,	but	









derstands  itself  as  a  fundamental  discipline  of  the  
critique	of	social	abstractions,	which	works	out	the	
justification	 of	 the	wrongness	of	 the	bourgeois	life	
context,	 which	 is	 in	 the	 Critique  of  the  political  
economics  only presupposed or  left  out  by Marx.”  
(p.	13)	
The	book	presupposes	 that	Marxs’	work	can	
accomplish  more  than  stay  at  the  level  of  
“marxisms”.	 Marxist	 philosophy	 must	 turn	
into  an  abstract-critical  concrete  philosophy  








Consciousness is a timeless and central topic 
in	philosophy,	especially	as	it	pertains	to	the	
mind-body	problem.	While,	on	the	one	hand,	
the existence of consciousness is a truth that 
is	 certain	 to	us,	on	 the	other	hand,	 the	natu-
re  of  consciousness  seems  to  be  radically  
different  in  kind from the  nature  of  physical  
matter.	How,	 then,	 are	we	 to	 understand	 the	
relation	between	first-person	subjective	expe-
rience  and  the  third-person  physical  world?  
The	physicalist	 suggests	 that	every	property,	
including	 mentality,	 supervenes	 on	 some	
physical	 property.	 Against	 this	 view,	 some	
philosophers  have  commented  on  the  failure  
of physical science to account for the reality 
of	subjective	experience.	The	dualist,	therefo-
re,	states	that	physicalism	is	false	and	instead	
endorses the philosophical thesis that conscio-
usness is a fundamental entity that is ontolo-
gically distinct from physical matter. Squaring 
up	to	the	challenge	of	the	mind-body	problem,	
Philip	Goff’s	book,	Consciousness and Fun-
damental  Reality,	 is	 an	 engaging	 work	 in	
speculative metaphysics that  seeks to offer a 
somewhat different view.
Goff is perhaps most well known as a defen-
der	 of	 panpsychism,	 which	 is	 the	 view	 that	
mentality  is  ubiquitous  in  the  natural  world.  
His preferred version of panpsychism in this 
book	is	cosmopsychism,	which	suggests	that	
the  universe  itself  instantiates  some  form  of  
mentality. Since he takes consciousness to be 
irreducible	 and	 fundamental,	 he	 agrees	with	
the dualist and disagrees with the physicalist. 
However,	he	is	disinclined	to	concede	fully	to	
dualism,	 which	 he	 considers	 as	 providing	 a	
disunified	picture	of	the	world.	Rather,	he	sug-
gests that his panpsychism is a form of neutral 
monism	which	 has	 been	 termed	 “Russellian	
monism”,	 although	 it	 is	 contested	 whether	
Bertrand	Russell	fully	supported	this	view.
The	book	is	structured	in	two	parts.	In	the	first	
part	 of	 the	 book,	 Goff	 presents	 a	 refutation	
of  physicalism.  He  discusses  some  establis-
hed	 arguments	 against	 physicalism,	 namely	
Frank	 Jackson’s	 knowledge	 argument	 and	
David	 Chalmers’	 conceivability	 argument.	
While	Goff	sees	merits	in	these	arguments,	he	
does not think they are wholly satisfactory in 
their  traditional  forms.  He  concedes  that  the  
knowledge argument successfully demonstra-
tes an epistemological gap between physicali-
ty	and	phenomenality,	but	contends	that	more	
is  needed  to  make  this  into  a  metaphysical  
gap.  He also considers  the conceivability  ar-
gument,	as	 traditionally	presented,	 to	be	 tro-
ublesome  because  it  invokes  a  contentious  
two-dimensional  semantic  framework.  To  
make	 these	 arguments	 successful,	 Goff	 pro-
poses that we need to appeal to the notion of 
phenomenal	 transparency.	A	 concept,	 he	 sti-
pulates,	is	transparent	“just	in	case	it	reveals	
the	nature	of	the	entity	it	refers	to,	in	the	sense	
that it is a priori (for someone possessing the 
concept  and  in  virtue  of  possessing  the  con-
cept)	what it is for that entity to be part of re-
ality”.	Phenomenal	 transparency,	 then,	 is	 the	
notion	 that	“phenomenal	concepts	 reveal	 the	
nature  of  the  conscious  states  they  refer  to”.  
Goff uses this notion of phenomenal transpa-
rency to  modify  the  conceivability  argument  
into a version which he considers to be more 
successful  at  undermining physicalism.  Take 
P	 to	be	a	physical	fact	such	as	C-fibre	 firing	
and Q  to  be  an  associated  phenomenal  fact  
such  as  the  experience  of  pain.  According  
to	 the	modified	 conceivability	 argument,	 the	
conceivability	 of	 “P  and  not  Q”  entails  the  
possibility	of	“P and not Q”	because	“P” and 
“Q”  are  independent  concepts  that  are  both  
transparent.
However,	 Goff’s	 refutation	 of	 physicalism	
does not stop here. Although he suggests that 
the  notion  of  phenomenal  transparency  en-
hances	 the	 conceivability	 argument,	 he	 also	
proposes that the notion of phenomenal tran-
sparency  undermines  physicalism more  stra-
